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Introduction
The Air Force has a long history of developing expeditionary airpower that can rapidly deploy to provide support to the combatant commander. To provide this support, the Air Force Chief of Staff is developing force modules to provide improved capabilities for "rapidly opening an airfield, sizing . . . mobility throughput, or generating a certain sortie level with fighters and bombers. These force modules could include initial airbase establishment, command and control, mission generation, and airbase operations concepts."
1 This next step in the Air Force expeditionary journey will require a strong bare base program as the foundation for these force module packages. However, the current program is not capable of providing the support required by the Chief of Staff to support the combatant commanders.
The Air Force war reserve materiel (WRM) program consists of bare base assets, fueldistribution equipment and storage, munitions, afloat prepositioned capabilities, tank racks, adapters and pylons, prepositioned sites throughout the world 2 , special purpose and generalpurpose vehicles, and medical facilities and supplies. Base assets that include tents, shelters, generators, water purification, showers, and other housekeeping essentials. Thus, to analyze the entire program is beyond the scope of this paper. The foundation of the WRM program, base assets are the key to establishing forward airbases at bare base location and enabling the Air Force to rapidly deploy forces. Therefore, this paper focuses on bare base assets. It reviews the bare base program's history, evaluates its current challenges, and proposes solutions to improve support for today's expeditionary Air Force operations. 
Notes

History of Bare Base
At the end of World War II, the military leadership realized that a highly mobile force was required to support and sustain the expanding military missions around the world. 1 These missions put a premium on the Air Force having the capability to rapidly deploy and operate from any bare base location 2 and gave birth to the current bare base concept of being able to establish an airbase anywhere in the world, with water and an airfield. Today, massive tent cities for 5,000 people can be established within days in austere locations throughout the world. These tent cities have assorted facilities with electrical and water systems, latrines and showers, sewage systems, kitchens, air-conditioning, and shops for transportation, civil engineering, services, aircraft maintenance, and operations. Additionally, airfield lighting, fuel storage and distribution systems, aircraft arresting, navigational aids, revetments, and warehouses, support flying operations for hundreds of combat aircraft.
The bare base equipment during World War II and the Korean conflict used existing buildings to the maximum extent. It consisted of canvas tents but no aircraft shelters and was all moved by truck convoys and trains. Setting up an operational base required a significant amount of time and effort. As the concept matured, the Air Force realized it needed to be able to establish an airbase in a shorter period of time. The bare base program needed to be "mobile, able to move quickly, pack up, and move as the ground forces advanced and retreated" 3 but was hampered by the weight and size of the equipment. At the same time the Air Force was adjusting to the new requirements of the nuclear mission in the 1950s, the bare base program got a push to improve its ability to deploy worldwide. The Air Force created the composite air strike force (CASF) unit to establish the capability to be a worldwide, deployable nuclear response force. It developed the first mobility support kits, consisting of tents, field kitchens, medical facilities, power generators, cots, desks, and other equipment. However, the kits were not able to achieve the level of mobility needed, and work continued to improve the capability to move the CASF's heavy, bulky, and outdated equipment. 4 In the 1960s the trend toward lighter and more mobile bare base assets accelerated when
Secretary of Defense McNamara castigated the Air Force for its delay in deploying forces to
Vietnam, pending construction and completion of expensive permanent facilities. 5 This criticism led to the creation of the Tactical Air Command's (TAC) Grey Eagle detachment which was directed to develop a suite of equipment consisting of four sets able to support 1,100 people each. Taking advantage of the speed and mobility of the C-130 aircraft, the TAC Grey Eagle support kits marked the beginning of greater reliance on airlift to move bare base equipment and added to the amount of tonnage that would need to be moved with limited airlift assets. This increased mobility came at a price, however, as it required 75 C-130 sorties to transport a single 1,100-person set. 6 With several more innovations, the Air Force was able to reduce the size and weight of the Grey Eagle equipment by half, from 1,500,000 to 650, 000 pounds. But outsized and heavy equipment still had to be transported by surface modes. The heavy and outsized problem was never completely eliminated until advances in aircraft design produced the C-141, C-5, and C-17, which enabled all bare base equipment to be air transported, as long as it was designed to fit on these aircraft. Today moving a single 1100-person set still requires roughly 64 C-130 sorties. Thus, the issue has now shifted to one of movement priority, a problem equally as challenging. Methods employed to alleviate the airlift availability issue include prepositioning equipment in Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and Europe and putting bare base equipment on ships that can be moved to the desired location. All have had good results as long as the equipment is located close to or at the bare base location.
Despite the development and transportation challenges, the bare base program has provided the Air Force the ability to establish airbases anywhere it needs in the world in every conflict since Korea. The lessons learned during each conflict and, more importantly, the realization that the Air Force is not able to establish an airbase "anywhere" in the world has led to a refinement of the bare base concept. To be light and fast has required deploying to locations that have a basic airfield infrastructure. Thus, the bare base program has abandoned its "anywhere in the world" theme and adopted the more realistic approach of anywhere in the world that has "a runway, source of water, and nothing else." 7 In summary, the development process that started with the composite air strike force using World War II equipment and was followed by TAC Grey Eagle has matured into the current inventory of Harvest Falcon (HF) and Harvest Eagle (HE) equipment sets.
The current bare base program consists of two main sets of equipment, HF and HE. The HF set, designed for longer duration flying, supports operations in Southwest Asia and consists of 1,100-person housekeeping, industrial operations, initial flight line, and follow-on flight line sets.
The smaller HE equipment sets, intended for use in Europe and the Pacific, are comprised of 550-person-housekeeping utilities packages and 550-person cold weather sets. The Pacific Air
Forces also maintain a smaller version of the HE equipment, designed to expand the billeting and feeding capacities at existing installations, which consists of 275-person housekeeping and 275-person kitchen sets. 8 The bare base program's long history of efforts to be more mobile continues today as the Air Force looks for ways to meet future expeditionary needs of the future.
The e-Falcon and the Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) are the next line of innovations to support the Air Force's need to be able to deploy even faster. The e-Falcon program is an attempt to reconfigure the existing bare base assets (HE and HF) to meet the Air and Space Expeditionary Force's (AEF) timing to establish a base within five days from the deployment order. 9 The objective of the e-Falcon program is to be able to accomplish its modifications at no cost and provide the needed equipment for the most likely bare base scenario. Essentially the e-Falcon concept of operations will be a very lean package up front, which will increase in capability as the deployment matures. 10 Similarly, the BEAR concept is attempting to develop a basic configuration that will support the various force modules, but also include capabilities only needed with a specific weapon system or operation. For example, cold weather equipment would be added as required but would not be taken just because it is a part of the housekeeping set. More than 43 units operated out of 25 locations; more than 22,000 people deployed, with more than 14,000 arriving by air to augment the more than 21,000 already in theater; 11,000 logistics personnel, including more than 10,000 maintainers, supported the effort; 530 aircraft flew more than 29,000 sorties, including more than 5,800 by Air Mobility Command, for a total of 86,367 flight hours.
3
In the first 100 days of OEF, there were 12,000 people deployed to 14 different locations.
Two hundred aircraft flew 11,000 sorties, airlifted approximately 5,000 tons of munitions, and The Air Force must transition to the next level in our expeditionary journey and fully explain to the Combatant Commanders how we present forces . . . . We will do this by developing force modules that very roughly size a force package to a task, thus enabling a systematic presentation of our capabilities, rapidly opening an airfield, sizing a specific level of mobility throughput, or generating a certain sortie level with fighters and bombers. These force modules could include initial airbase establishment, command and control, mission generation, and airbase operations concepts . . . 4 The current AEF goal, to have an airbase up and running at any bare base location in the world five days after the deployment starts, constitutes a challenge that the Air Force has never been able to overcome.
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For example, for various reasons not a single OEF location was able to achieve this goal. Even with some bases in the region having US forces present, and others possessing little more than a runway, the Air Force struggled to become operational quickly.
Diego Garcia was operational in 17 days, while Jacobabad, Pakistan, took 73 days. At Jacobabad, 73 days were needed for site preparation, establishment of force protections, repair to deteriorating parking ramps, communications set up, and building of munitions pads and a tent city. 6 To bed down forces, OEF utilized, 1,564 civil engineering people at nine austere locations.
Construction projects included runway repair, ramp construction, tent cities, maintenance areas, and aircraft shelters. Of the 83,000 tons of cargo moved to support OEF, 70,000 tons were required to set up and sustain the forward operating airbases. 7 This support included civil engineering equipment, tentage, shower and shave units, water-purification systems, fuels mobility support equipment (FMSE) (e.g., bladders, hoses, and pumps), and munitions. These efforts would have not been possible without the bare base program, which enables the Air Force to set up an airbase rapidly almost anywhere in the world.
RAND studies emphasize that the AEF concept "depends on the agility and responsiveness of the support system to provide the resources needed to conduct operations in areas of the world. The effectiveness and efficiency of that support system are in turn, … critically dependent on strategic support decisions such as infrastructure investment in forward operating locations, forward support locations, and transportation." 8 The agility and responsiveness of the support are even more critical as the Air Force moves to the force module concept. However, the recent studies have not included an in-depth look at the core component that enables the entire system to operate--bare base assets. There has been little research to determine if the bare base program is capable of supporting future operations. For instance, during OEF bare base equipment was not up to standards:
"The sites required housekeeping sets, industrial sets, FMSE, munitions, and other equipment from the WRM assets. At the end of the deployment phase of OEF, of the 28 mission-ready Harvest Falcon sets, 15 complete sets were deployed, 11 sets were missing several components, and/or needed maintenance to be ready for use, and 2 mission-ready sets were held in reserve. The 11 sets were primarily missing similar assets like power distribution units, lighting units, and expandable common-use shelters."
9 This paper will now examine the bare base deficiencies that require immediate attention to ensure the program can provide the support needed and expected.
Program Challenges
The program has several challenges it must overcome, with the most important concerning the status of the equipment, requirements, high usage rates, indirect use, and finally, funding.
This section will examine each of these issues in depth.
Mission Readiness Figure 1 is an overall summary of the Air Force bare base requirements and the missionready sets available to support deployment operations just prior to OEF. One factor in the inability to build complete sets in both programs can be attributed to the difficulty in replacing several single items in sufficient quantities to bring a set up to missionready status. For example, in the HF area of power generation, the program is short 5,497 of the 6,680 required power distribution panels, which are budgeted for in the FY03 Air Force Program Objective Memorandum (POM). 13 To obtain the required HF sets shown in Figure 1 , the program must have 6,680 panels. Additionally, the program needs 1,974 more environmental control units (ECU), 14 which are programmed in the FY06 budget. 15 There are several required assets that are programmed in the FY02-FY06 budget, and until these assets can be purchased, the mission-ready rates will change little. Similarly, the HE program has none of the power distribution panels it needs and is using a work-around to overcome the shortfall. suggestions on package size, was identified in the workshop minutes. Furthermore, none of the proposed packages for the BEAR concept are close to the HF housekeeping set sizes that account for the majority of sets in the inventory, which are designed for 1,100 people.
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Another issue that the BEAR concept will face is its ability to compete in the Air Force Since the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force has repeatedly used its bare base sets to support numerous contingencies and exercises. In 1992, bare base equipment was used to support two operations-Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Provide Comfort in Iraq. In 1996, it was used to support 22 exercises and contingencies, ranging from Dhahran bombing to Operation Desert Strike.
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The program was able to recover and build to 20 mission-ready sets when the attack on the Khobar Towers occurred, and bare base equipment was needed to relocate the operation at Dhahran to Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). This event again significantly reduced the inventory of available housekeeping sets, which were used for the PSAB tent city until permanent dorms were constructed in late 1997. 24 When the housekeeping sets were reconstituted in 2000, many were condemned and required additional program funds to replace, illustrating yet another hazard of using bare base equipment intended for temporary use for long-term events. The Air
Force's contractor estimated that more than 530 tents could not be reconstituted due to dry rot and general deterioration. 25 Finally, the program started to make readiness improvements in 1998, only to be called on once again to support Operation Allied Force. Most recently, all but two of the mission-ready housekeeping sets were used to support OEF. 26 Furthermore, significant problems exist with the way the equipment is treated and operated.
An Air Force audit summarized the issue by observing that ". . . equipment from these operations has often been returned in poor condition and has required significant repairs…the Air Force Inspector General noted that prepositioned equipment was generally treated as a disposable, one-time use commodity and that user attitudes had often led to equipment abuses." 27 The high usage rate, coupled with the maltreatment and extended use of bare base equipment, has hindered efforts to replace and reconstitute assets fast enough for the program to achieve even a 50-percent mission-ready status just one time in the 12 years shown on the chart. With a stated program requirement to have 50 mission-ready housekeeping sets, the HF program maintained just an average of 12.5 mission-ready housekeeping sets, or a 25-percent readiness rate, between 1991 and 2002. The program is in a continual "use-fix-use" 28 cycle that simply does not allow it to recover. This cycle is further complicated by indirect mission support, which allows the use of bare base assets to support day-to-day events not associated with an exercise or operation.
Indirect Mission Support
Bare base equipment continues to be used to support the daily Air Force mission and other activities for which it was not intended, a condition referred to as indirect mission support.
Between 1996 and 2000, there was an annual average of 120 approved requests but only eight disapproved requests. 29 The overall impact of indirect mission support has been a decrease in the mission-ready status of bare base sets that the asset is intended to support. and maintenance costs by charging a "rental" fee, 32 but they fall short of covering the total cost associated with purchasing, storing, and maintaining an asset. Additionally, the Air Force accounting system will not allow the WRM system to charge for procurement funds to replace the asset if damage is beyond use when it is returned. Thus, the WRM program element is the bare base program element that is paying the bill when a piece of equipment is used for an exercise, operation, or indirect mission support. Consequently, with each incident of indirect support, the bare base account loses funding, and in the current budgeting process asset replacement normally takes three to five years. 33 In addition, the indirect mission-support equipment is treated the same as other bare base equipment, increasing the costs to program. A 1998 GAO reported captured the magnitude of the impact of indirect mission support:
Certain key items, such as tents, generators, and air-conditioners, have been used the most and replaced the most frequently. For example, between January 1996 and April 1998, more than 3,000 tents and nearly 4,500 air-conditioning units-about the number required for 27 or 30 complete housekeeping sets, respectively-were deployed from storage locations in Oman and Bahrain to locations throughout the theater. At Prince Sultan Air Base alone, approximately 3,000 air-conditioning units are currently either in use or have been designated as backup units.
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The Air Force has considered using commercial sources of equipment to support these requirements but has found the use of bare base assets more cost-effective. 
Funding
Funding has been and will continue to be the greatest challenge to the program. The bare base program needs an average of $112.3 million per year through years FY04-09 to get the program healthy and fund the required improvements. Currently the program is short in the FY04-09 POM an average of $48.6 million in each year. Specifically, it will require an average of $35.7 million in procurement annually and $12.9 million of operations and maintenance funds each year between FY04 and FY09. These amounts are more than the $278 million to fix the bare base program by FY09, as shown in Figure 3 . The program has a significant bill to pay, with the annual budget being over $100 million starting in FY04. 
Will the Bare Base Program be There When Needed?
The Chief of Staff is developing force modules to provide improved capabilities for rapidly opening an airfield or generating the needed number of fighter and bomber sorties anywhere in the world. These force modules include initial airbase establishment, command and control, mission generation, and airbase operations activities. This next step in the expeditionary journey will require a strong bare base program as its foundation. But is the bare base program capable of supporting this level of effort? Based on the data provided in this paper, indications are that the task will be a challenging one. The program has not been able to recover since the end of the Gulf War, with the best mission-readiness status topping out at 50 percent in 1998 and the average readiness rate hovering around 25 percent. During this period there was simply not enough bare base equipment mission ready to support a major conflict or, in the worse case, two major theater wars in two or more regions. Based on the projected funding, continued indirect mission support, and high usage rate, there can be no reasonable scenario to indicate that the mission-ready status can exceed the last 10-year average of 12.5 housekeeping sets in the next 5 to 10 years. In 1996 the HF program's ability to field just one housekeeping set got the attention of the Chief of Staff, who identified several problem areas and directed AF/IL to fix them. 1 The AF/IL made changes to remedy program deficiencies and estimated then that several years would be required to get the program healthy.
The need to have bare base assets is widely understood among some Air Force leaders. As
General John W. Handy stated in his Congressional testimony following Operation Allied Force:
"Rapid reconstitution following operations plays a key role in maintaining the readiness of the USAF to reengage for future conflicts. As this committee is fully aware, we need to 're-load' our resources of munitions, spares, and equipment expended during Allied Force to ensure we have the capability to meet the next contingency . . . ." The Air Force began OEF with 28 housekeeping sets on hand, and the operation utilized only five percent of the fleet. 4 Seventeen HF housekeeping sets were fully mission-ready, and 15 of these were used to set up the OEF airbases. Two sets were kept in reserve, while the 11 remaining HF housekeeping sets were pieced together to provide varying degrees of support throughout the OEF region. 5 Consequently, the Air Force now has only enough housekeeping sets in the area of responsibility to bed down an additional 2,200 people. Further before the process of building additional set can begin, several thousand items must be purchased for the sets that are being reconstituted. Prior to the start of OEF, the HF sets required the purchase of 12,457 major components to rebuild them. This number will significantly grow as a result of OEF using all the HFs except two. Moreover, the program element from which these funds will come to buy the assets is already underfunded by $35.6 million each year in the FY04-09 POM. For one thing, the established requirements for the bare base program need to be revalidated.
This author could not find a solid methodology for determining requirements to set up an airbase at a bare base location. The existing operations plan requirements have been established using historical information rather than sound analysis, and without some analysis, the program will always be plagued with doubts about the number of sets needed. Although these requirements have not been adjusted in more than 20 years, the world has changed significantly, especially the spectrum of conflict across which the Air Force is now expected to operate. 
What Does the Air Force Need to Fix?
The draft NMS discussion of risk management sums up the situation facing the Air Force's bare base program:
Assessing risk begins with the articulation of a core military requirement against which existing and projected capabilities can be measured. A core military requirement is a broad, unconstrained expression of what the Joint Force must be able to do to execute this strategy. With unlimited resources, meeting the core military requirement can be accomplished at low to negligible military risk as success is virtually assured. However, when resources are constrained, choices must be made and levels of risk assessed and accepted before military operations are undertaken. and a request for a third to keep the program alive, allocating and appropriating $278 million in the budget to fix this program is highly unlikely. Despite an average less than 50-percent mission-readiness rate over the last 12 years, the Air Force was still able to support most conflicts it faced. Such was the case in OEF as the program was able to use pieces of 11 unserviceable sets to provide basic support.
The Air Force leadership clearly comprehends the importance of the bare base program for expeditionary operations and realizes that inadequate funding levels gradually degrade capability, reduce supportability, and increase repair and reconstitution costs. While new technology to ease setup and tear down will help, the program's largest challenge is in the management of existing assets. Therefore, the following recommendations are made to improve the readiness status of the bare base program.
First, AF/IL must issue policy stopping indirect mission support of HF and HE assets, a practice that perpetuates the use-fix-use cycle. By subsidizing every exercise and deployment that plans to use the bare base assets but does not plan to pay for their replacement or reconstitution, this support costs the program millions of dollars each year. Completely stopping the indirect mission support of HF and HE will be difficult to implement. The Air Force has become accustom to using the assets when required or desired. But every reduction in peacetime use can free up for critically needed funds to reconstitute other sets.
Second, the program must charge all customers for the cost of using the equipment in every event. The program is established based on wartime requirements, as identified in the operations plans. As a normal course of "reloading" after a conflict, the cost of reconstituting the equipment and getting it ready for the next conflict should be standard operating procedures.
The program should be able to charge to maintain, store, and issue equipment as required, but, in contrast to what has occurred after every operation in the last decade, it should not bear the burden of using these funds to reconstitute and replace equipment.
Third, maltreatment of equipment must cease. Such abuse is a squadron and wing level leadership issue and is totally inexcusable. Though the program has management and accountability policies, no one seems to own the equipment once it goes to the field. The Air Force must change its throwaway mindset regarding bare base assets and must hold units accountable when wrong doing is found.
The decades-old requirement must be revalidated. AF/IL in conjunction with Air Force materiel Command, must develop methodologies or formulas to determine the right amount of equipment required to set up an airbase at a bare base location today and in the near future.
Finally, research and development is primarily focused on lighter and stronger equipment, faster setup, and better maintainability but not on what is needed to support an F/A-22 or B-2 type aircraft. Given acquisition and development lead times, fielding these items prior to 2010 is unlikely and not possible without immediate POM funding. 
Conclusion
The future security environment will require the Air Force to be even more flexible.
According to the new NMS, the key to being able to employ and sustain forces anywhere ". . . is the ability to quickly transition from one type of operation to another or between phases of an operation. This concept allows US forces to conduct and sustain multiple simultaneous missions in the geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions of the world". 
